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Theories  of  taste-based  discrimination  predict  that  competitive  pressures  will  drive 
discriminatory behavior out of the market. Using detailed matched employer-employee data, 
we  analyze  how  firm  takeovers  and  product  market  competition  affect  firms’  gender 
composition and gender wage gap. Taking into account several endogeneity concerns while 
using  a  difference-in-difference  framework,  we  find  that  the  share  of  female  employees 
increases  as  a  result  of  an  ownership  change  when  product  market  competition  is  weak. 
Furthermore, we find that a takeover reduces the gender wage gap. While the estimated effects 
are small, the results support the main theoretical predictions. 
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Introduction 
 
Women earn lower salaries and are far less likely to hold high ranking corporate management 
positions  than  men.  Even  Sweden,  a  country  perceived  to  enjoy  high  gender  equality,  is 
characterized by large gender differences in wages and carriers (see e.g. Albrecht et al. 2003). 
Furthermore, women only held 12 percent of top management positions in Swedish publicly 
listed  firms  in  2005  (Renstig  and  Westlin  2006).  If  these  differences  occur  because  of 
discrimination against women on the labor market, this constitutes a major inefficiency. Ever 
since 1957, when Becker presented his seminal theory of taste-based discrimination, it has 
been  suggested  that  labor  market  discrimination  can  be  competed  away,  at  least  if 
discrimination is based on employer preferences.  
An implication of Becker’s theory is that competitive pressures will reduce inefficient 
management  practices  in  general  and  discriminatory  practices  in  particular.  While  this  is 
usually  interpreted  as  inefficient  firms  being  competed  away  from  the  market,  another 
possibility is that existing firms adjust their behavior when competitive pressures increase the 
relative  cost  of  poor  management.  In  this  process,  the  firm  takeover  market  can  play  an 
important role. First of all, takeovers have long been regarded as a restraint on inefficient 
management behavior. Second, firms with inefficient management practices may be taken over 
by other firms. When inefficient management practices allow discriminatory practices to linger 
in an organization, competitive pressures should improve the relative labor market position for 
women. This paper will address just this issue; we examine how competitive pressures in the 
form of takeovers and product market competition affect labor market outcomes for women.  
When discrimination pervades the labor market, women are paid less in relation to their 
marginal product than men. That being the case, non-discriminatory firms would be expected   3 
to hire more women than discriminatory firms. On the other hand, a non-discriminatory firm 
has no incentive to pay women more than the going market wage. The theoretical predictions 
regarding the effects of competitive pressures on gender wage differences on firm level are 
hence less straightforward. Still, one can expect that competitive pressures would reduce these 
differences  for  two  main  reasons.  First,  women  often  lack  career  opportunities  in 
discriminatory  firms.  Since  wages  are  closely  tied  to  an  employee’s  hierarchical  position, 
female relative wages should be higher in non-discriminatory firms. Second, discriminatory 
owners may disproportionately share firm-level rents with men.  
We  use  detailed  Swedish  employer-employee  data  to  analyze  how  product  market 
competition  and  firm  takeovers  affect  workforce  gender  composition  and  gender  wage 
differentials. The study covers the period 1990-2002 and uses data on the entire private sector.  
In  addition  to  providing  high  quality  data,  this  study  addresses  the  prediction  that  firm 
takeovers affect labor market outcomes for women; previous empirical studies in this area have 
merely focused on the effects of product market competition.
1 Moreover, we use a theoretically 
sound measure of product market comp etition developed by Boone  et al. (2007) and Boone 
(2008),  whereas  previous  studies  have  mainly  relied  on  rudimentary  measures  such  as 
concentration ratios. 
 
                                                 
1 The only study, at least of which we are aware, studying ownership changes and discrimination, is Hellerstein et 
al. (2002). They study if firms with a low share of women are more likely to be taken over on a sample of US 
firms, but find no such effects. They do not, however, study the effects of takeovers on the composition of 
employees.   4 
Theoretical discussion and earlier literature 
Discrimination due to inefficient management 
Theories  of  taste-based  discrimination  suggest  that  under  some  conditions,  market 
forces  will  work  to  reduce  discriminatory  or  other  inefficient  management  practices.
2  The 
reason is that discrimination comes at a cost to the firm owner. Thus, if product market 
competition is strong, firms that incur the efficiency loss from discriminating against women 
will be competed away from the market.
3 Alternatively, firms may change their behavior as 
competition increases the costs incurred by a discriminating firm.
4 Despite mixed results from 
early  research  on  the  relation  between  product  market  competition  and  labor  market 
discrimination, later studies tend to find that competition on the product market  restrains 
discrimination (see e.g. Ashenfelter and Hannan 1986, Black and Brainerd 2004, Hellerstein et 
al. 2002, Meng 2004, and Zweimüller et al. 2008).
5 Competition on the ownership market is 
another channel through which discrimination may be reduced. None -discriminatory owners 
can take over discriminating firms and, by running them more efficiently, earn higher profits. 
Since the scope for efficiency improvements is likely to be higher in markets with a low degree 
of product market competition, takeovers and competition  can work as substitutes when it 
comes to reducing discrimination. 
                                                 
2 Hellerstein et al. (2002) provide a simple model that clearly illustrates the main predictions from Becker’s theory 
of discrimination. 
3 Perfect product market competition will put an end to discrimination if there are a sufficient number of potential 
employers with non-discriminatory tastes. Entry will also terminate discrimination when there is at least one non -
discriminating employer and non-decreasing returns to scale (Becker, 1971).   
4 Weber and Zulehner (2010) study start-ups on Austrian data and find evidence that both mechanisms are at 
work: the survival rate is significantly shorter for discriminatory firms and surviving discriminatory firms seem to 
react to the competitive pressures by increasing their female workforce over time. 
5 It should be noted that Zweimüller et al. (2008) analyze gender wage gaps between countries and use a country 
level indicator of general market orientation.   5 
While  outright  discrimination  may  be  rare  today,  there  are  reasons  to  expect 
discriminatory practices to linger in an organization as such. Based on psychological evidence, 
Bertrand et al. (2005) suggest that a great deal of discrimination may be unintentional, rather 
than due to preferences for or against a certain group. Hence, well-functioning human resource 
management may be important for reducing this type of “implicit” discrimination.
6 To the 
extent that more efficient firms have better human resource management, the theory of implicit 
discrimination yields the same predictions for the impact of market forces on the labor market 
outcome for men and women as the taste-based theory of discrimination.
7 
While the original Becker-theory was derived in an owner-manager setting, it also has 
implications when ownership and firm management are separated. In such cases, it is possible 
that market forces help disciplining firm managers who may pursue their own objectives (such 
as discriminating against women) rather than maximizing shareholder value.
8 In either setting, 
we expect there to be a larger share of women employed when product market competition 
limits inefficient management behavior. Fur thermore, we expect firm takeovers to be one 
channel through which poor management practices are replaced by more efficient ones (Jensen 
1988).
9  Thus, on average, we expect the share of female employees to increase after an 
acquisition has taken place, and  this effect should be especially large when product market 
competition is weak. 
                                                 
6 In general, improvements in human resource management seem to be related to improvement in productivity 
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). More specifically, Åslund and Nordström-Skans (2007) find that the introduction 
of anonymous job applications resulted in a higher rate of female hires in Sweden. This suggests that recruiter 
biases indeed affect the hiring process, but that better practices reduce discrimination. 
7 Indeed, Bloom and van Reenen (2007) find that poor personnel management is more likely to survive in less 
competitive industries. Family-controlled firms, in which managers are arguably protected from takeover threats, 
exhibit particularly poor management practices, for example. 
8 The literature on this topic is too large to cite. However, Nickell (1996) provides a nice discussion of the various 
mechanisms through which competitive forces can affect corporate performance through this channel and others. 
9 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) present evidence that firm managers respond to anti-takeover laws by 
reducing their efforts to improve firm productivity.    6 
What  about  effects on the wages  of men and  women? Since wages  are set by the 
market, it is not clear that takeovers and differences in product market competition should give 
rise  to  varying  gender  wage  differentials  across  firms.  Even  non-discriminatory  profit 
maximizing owners have no incentive to pay wages higher than the going market wage. To be 
more precise, gender wage differences ought to be the same for all firms recruiting similar 
workers  in  the  same  labor  market.  The  relevant  market  for  a  certain  type  of  labor  may, 
however, only be firms active in one or two industries. In this case, stronger competition on the 
product market may reduce the industry’s equilibrium gender wage gap. If, on the other hand, 
the  type  of  labor  is  used  in  many  sectors  in  the  economy,  changes  in  product  market 
competition in one industry should only have negligible effects on the firm’s gender wage gap. 
An analogous reasoning suggests that the effects of a change in firm ownership may be limited 
since a change in a single firm’s attitude towards women will only have marginal effects on 
equilibrium wages.  
This said, there are reasons to study wage differences between men and women. First, 
female career opportunities may differ between firms as a result of inefficient management 
practices.
10 Another reason is that firms may share rents with workers. Weak product market 
competition  should  give  rise  to  larger  rents  and ,  thus,  possibly  higher  wages.  Sin ce 
discriminating firms prefer men, these rents may be disproportionally shared with their male 
employees. Indeed, a study of deregulation in the US banking sector by Black and Strahan 
(2001) find evidence of precisely such gender biased rent sharing; deregulation brought about a 
reduction of the gender wage gap by reducing male wages more than female. A related study of 
rent-sharing in Swedish firms also finds that rents are disproportionately shared with male 
                                                 
10  See  e.g.  Blau  and  DeVaro  (2006)  who  show  that,  on  average,  women  have  a  lower  probability  of  being 
promoted  than  men  when  controlling  for  productivity.  They  also  show  wages  to  be  intimately  related  to 
promotions. For a detailed analysis of such glass ceiling effects in Sweden, see Albrecht et al. (2003).   7 
employees (Nekby 2003). Thus, we expect product market competition to reduce male wages, 
thereby improving the relative wages of women. If a disproportionate share of rents do accrue 
to men in discriminatory firms, a takeover that reduces discrimination may also reduce the 
firm’s gender wage gap.  
Statistical discrimination 
Another  reason  behind  discrimination  is  information  difficulties  about  workers,  so-called 
statistical  discrimination.  Hiring  practices  are  then  related  to  group  attributes  rather  than 
individual characteristics (Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973).
11 If groups differ in average abilities and 
information  costs  are  high,  even  perfectly  rational  employers  would  discriminate  in  the 
statistical sense as such behavior is profitable. As in the case of implicit discrimination, it is 
possible that competitive forces compel firms to improve their management, but it is not clear 
how this would affect hiring practices. Among other things, better management could result in 
better screening processes of applicants. Improved screening would reduce the reliance  on 
group stereotypes, but the impact of this on hiring depends on the relative change in the signal-
to-noise ratio, as well as the distribution of attributes in the different groups. Therefore, there 
are  no  definite  predictions  regarding  the  relation  betwe en  competition  and  statistical 
discrimination.  
 
                                                 
11 See also Altonji and Blank (1999) for an overview of more recent research along those lines.   8 
Data and descriptive statistics 
Individual and firm-level data 
The analysis is based on several register-based data sets from Statistics Sweden spanning the 
period 1990-2002 and covering the entire private sector. First, for the period 1996-2002, the 
financial statistics (FS) contain detailed firm-level information on all Swedish firms in the 
private sector. For the period 1990-1995, we have data on all manufacturing firms with at least 
20 employees and non-manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees. Examples of variables 
included  are  value  added,  capital  stock  (book  value),  number  of  employees,  total  wages, 
ownership status, profits, sales and industry affiliation. 
Second, Regional Labor Market Statistics (RAMS) includes data on all establishments 
spanning the period 1990-2002. RAMS adds establishment information on the composition of 
the labor force with respect to educational level and demographics.
12  
Finally, the individual wage statistics database (LS) contains detailed information from 
official registers on a very large representative sample of employed individuals.
13 The LS 
spans the period 1990-2002 and has approximately 2 million observations per year, which is 
roughly 50 percent of the Swedish labor force. Examples of variables included are full -time 
equivalent wages, education, labor market experience and gender. The data sets are matched by 
unique identification codes. To make the sample of firms consistent through out the time 
period, we restrict our analysis to firms with at least 20 employees.  
                                                 
12 The plant level data are aggregated at the firm level. 
13 The sampling units of Statistics Sweden’s annual salary survey consist of firms that are included in Statistics 
Sweden’s firm data base (FS). A representative sample of firms is drawn from FS and stratified according to 
industry affiliation and firm size (number of employees). The Central Confederation of Private Employers then 
provides employee information to Statistics Sweden on all its member firms that have (i) at least ten employees 
and (ii) are included in the sample. Firms with at least 500 employees are examined with probability one. The 
final sample includes information on around 50 percent of all employees within the entire private sector.   9 
Firm-level data are used to identify takeovers and to construct a measure of the degree 
of competition.
14 Ownership changes are identified using two separate procedures. For  cross-
border ownership changes, data originate from a categorical variable defined as one if at least 
50 percent of the equity are foreign owned and zero otherwise.
15 For domestic takeovers, the 
official  Swedish  corporation  register,  administrated  by  Statistics  Sweden,  is  used.
16  This 
register includes data on all firms in Sweden that are part of a corporation. For each firm in a 
corporation, we have information on the firms’ parent company and the top-mother of the 
corporation. Our acquisition dummy is equal to one if (i) according to the foreign ownership 
variable, a firm changes ownership from domestic to foreign or from foreign to domestic, or 
(ii) a firm becomes part of another corporation, defined as a new top-mother of the corporation, 
using data from the corporation register. Our data enable us to analyze the effects of both 
cross-border acquisitions and purely domestic takeovers. Takeovers that we fail to identify are 
domestic ownership changes of small stand-alone firms that are not part of a corporation.  
 
                                                 
14 Note that since we only include firms in the private sector we do not study the impact of privatization of state 
owned firms. This would be a task worthy of a separate investigation. 
15 Statistics Sweden uses the internationally common 50 percent cut-off when defining ownership. We are not able 
to study whether the results are sensitive to this definition. However, other authors have studied the effects of 
takeover and in these cases, the results are not sensitive to cut-off values (see e.g. Martins (2004), and Barbosa 
and Louri (2002)). Although the 50 percent cut-off may be considered as crude, we are ultimately interested in 
whether a controlling owner is replaced by another controlling owner. Since the actual cut-off at which this occurs 
depends on the ownership structure as a whole, any cut-off level would be crude. 
16 Although Statistic Sweden is responsible for the corporation register, it has been collected and produced by the 
consulting firm MM Partners since 1996. This means that we have corporation register information from Statistics 
Sweden for 1990-1995 and from MM partners for the period 1996-2002. The same methodology for producing 
the corporation register is, however, used over the entire period. Due to the change in who produces the 
corporation register in 1996, we choose not to include information on changes in the firms’ corporation status 
between the years 1995 and 1996. 
   10 
Measure of product market competition 
In the empirical literature on product market competition and discrimination, competition has 
usually been measured using industry-level concentration ratios and firm-level measures of 
market power. Product  market competition is, however, a rather vague concept that is not 
easily captured in a single empirical measure. The measurement issue is even more difficult 
since different changes in market conditions, i.e. anything that can be said to be associated with 
increased competition (e.g. firm entry or increased substitutability of goods), can have different 
implications  for  firm  behavior.  Therefore,  the  appropriate  measure  of  product  market 
competition is context specific. In our case, we want to use a measure of competition capturing 
how severely the market punishes inefficient firm behavior. To this end, we use a sophisticated 
measure of product market competition developed by Boone et al. (2007). 
Based on the theoretical work in Boone (2008), Boone et al. (2007) derive an empirical 
measure of product market competition precisely along these lines. The starting point is that 
traditional measures of competition, such as concentration ratios and price-cost margins, are 
theoretically invalid and especially concentration ratios are of limited empirical value. The 
theoretically  sound  measure  of  competition  they  derive  is  based  on  the  within-industry 
elasticity  of  profits  with  respect  to  marginal  costs.  The  higher  the  absolute  value  of  this 
elasticity, the fiercer is competition. In other words, the measure is based on an estimate of 
how much relative profits are reduced when there is an increase in firms’ marginal costs. The 
measure of competition is generated by estimating the following relation for each 2-digit SNI 
industry (i.e. 46 to 49 industries, depending on the year of observation),
17 using OLS: 
 
                                                 
17 SNI roughly corresponds to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC).   11 
ln (jt) = j + t + t ln (cjt) + εjt. 
 
Subscript j is a firm-level identifier and t indicates time period. Variable profits, , are defined 
as value added less the total wage bill. Marginal costs are approximated by average variable 
costs, c, which are defined as the total wage bill plus the costs of variable inputs (sales less 
value added), divided by sales.
18 Unobservable heterogeneity is taken into account by firm  
fixed effects, j, and time fixed effects, t. The absolute value of the estimated profit elasticity, 
t, is used as our time-varying industry measure of product market competition. 
Using this method, our results show that product market competition (averaged over the 
1990-2002 period) is lowest in utilities (SNI 40/41), followed by rental services (71), and the 
financial sector (65/67) and water transportation (61). Apparel and leather products (18/19) are 
the  most  competitive  industries,  followed  by  transport  equipment  (35)  and  electronic 
components (32). The resulting ranking of industries thus has a considerable intuitive appeal. 
The industries characterized by weak competition are mainly active on the domestic market, 
whereas measured product market competition is high in industries exposed to the international 
markets. The competition indicators are estimated with considerable precision: averaging by 
industry over the relevant years shows that the lowest t-statistic for any industry is 2.52.  
The pattern of product market competition across industries is quite stable over time: 
the rank correlations between competition and its one year and twelve year lags are 0.89 and 
0.72,  respectively.  This  is  reasonable  considering  that  there  are  inherent  characteristics 
determining the degree of competition in an industry. The average product market competition 
                                                 
18 In other words, c = (sales  value added + wages)/sales.   12 
across industries declined between 1990 and 1999, while it increased thereafter.
19 This pattern 
is likely to be related to the severe economic crisis that Sweden experienced during the 1990’s 
when a large number of firms went out of business. 
The Swedish takeover market 
As discussed earlier, inefficient management is a potential reason for a takeover. By 
replacing wasteful management practices, takeovers can increase productivity. Clearly there 
are also other reasons for takeovers, for example, firms may want to obtain market power or to 
get access to distribution channels.
20 The market for firm control in Sweden has become more 
competitive  over  time  as  the  rules  surrounding  foreign  ownership  have  become  less 
complicated. There was a substantial increase in foreign ownership in the Swedish economy 
during the 1990s. The share of  employees in foreign owned firms in the private sector 
increased from about 9 percent in 1990 to roughly 13 percent in 1996 and 23 percent in 2005 
(ITPS, 2006). There are several reasons for this development. For instance, the deregulation of 
capital and foreign exchange markets in the late 1980s opened up Sweden to inflows of FDI. 
Two other important factors include Swedish membership in the European Union in 1995 and 
the currency crisis in 1992. The latter event reduced the cost of Swedish assets and the  cost of 
locating production in Sweden. 
  On average, 6.5 percent of the firms changed ownership during the period 1991-2002 
and there is no trend in takeover activity; the acquisition rate hovers between 5 to 9 percent per 
year. The highest rate of acquisition is in manufacturing of coke and refined petroleum (16 
percent) and the lowest in the tanning and dressing of leather (0.1 percent).  When it comes to 
                                                 
19 The value is 6.2 for 1990, 4.4 in 1999 and 4.9 in 2002. 
20 However, Devos et al. (2009) show that mergers mainly generate gains by improving resource allocation, rather 
than increasing market power.   13 
raw numbers, the bulk of takeovers occur in the retail industry. Further, there are no obvious 
industry  specific  time  trends  in  merger  activity.  Table  1  presents  the  correlation  between 
takeover activity  and various industry characteristics  at  the two digit industry level.  There 
appears to be relatively many takeovers in industries with a low share of females, weak product 
market  competition,  low  capital  intensity,  large  firms  and  a  large  share  of  high  skilled 
employees. A negative correlation between takeovers and product market competition in a 
cross-section is no obvious problem in our econometric study since we use firm fixed effects. 
However, if changes in takeover activity affect product market competition, it could influence 
the interpretation of our results. As we find no indication of changes in competition being 






Variable  definitions  and  descriptive  statistics  are  presented  in  Table  2.  The  third 
column shows the mean and standard deviations for the whole sample of firms and the last 




                                                 
21 Industry level takeover activity is not correlated with product market competition in subsequent periods. 
Regression results are available upon request.   14 
As can be seen in the first row, on average about 30 percent of the employees are women and 
there is substantial variation across firms.
22 Men and women’s full-time equivalent salaries are 
presented in the lower panel. Pooling all years the raw gender wage gap is 16 percent, which is 
close to the figure found by Albrecht et al. (2003). In our sample the raw gender wage gap 
varies a little across years and has decreases somewhat during the period, in 1993 it was 18 
percent and 2002 16 percent.  These differences cannot be readily explained by differences in 
observed characteristics such as education, potential experience and workplace. Using our data 
we run a regression with log wages on a female dummy, (potential) experience and its square, 
seven  educational  dummies,  and  firm  specific  fixed  effects.  Our  estimates  show  an 
unexplained wage difference of 12 percent.   
Note that the reason why the variable means differ in the firm-level and individual-level 
study is that individual-level data naturally puts more weight on larger firms than data at the 
firm level.
23    
 
Testing predictions from the theory of taste-based discrimination  
The share of female employees 
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of product market competition and ownership 
changes on the share of female employees by estimating the following firm-level regression: 
 
                                                 
22 The female participation rate in Sweden is higher than 30 percent. In 2002, for example, women made up 48 
percent of the total workforce. The lower figures in this data set reflect that women to a high extent are employed 
in the public sector. 
23 Results for our firm-based analysis also hold for the sample of firms for which we also have access to 
individual-level data, the point estimates being similar to those for the full sample of firms (the results are 
available upon request).   15 
yjt  =  a1 acquisitionjt + a2 competitionjt + a3 acquisitionjt×competitionj +    (1) 
   Xjt’a + µj + µt + εjt.                    
 
Here, yjt is the share of women employed by firm j in time period t, while acquisition is an 
indicator variable taking the value of one in the period where an ownership change is recorded 
and  thereafter.  Competition  is  our  time-varying  industry-level  measure  of  product  market 
competition, described earlier. An obvious concern with this specification is that acquisitions 
may have an impact on the level of product market competition. Since our hypothesis is that 
the  efficiency  gains  from  an  acquisition  will  be  largest  in  industries  with  low  levels  of 
competition at the time of the acquisition, we interact the acquisition dummy with a measure of 
competition from the year of acquisition.  
Another concern is that changes in firms’ input mix will affect the optimal share of 
female employees, irrespective of ownership changes. Therefore, we include a vector, X, of 
firm-level control variables such as (log) firm size, capital intensity and the share of employees 
with  higher  education.  Since  all  these  variables  can  be  endogenous  to  takeovers,  we  will 
present specifications with and without these controls. Finally, µj and µt are firm and time 
period fixed effects and jt is the error term. To allow for within firm correlation over time, 
standard  errors  are  adjusted  for  clustering  at  the  firm  level.  In  some  specifications,  when 
studying the impact of product market competition, we cluster standard errors at the industry 
level. We expect a1 to be positive and a3 to be negative. In other words, we expect firms to 
employ a larger share of women after a new owner has taken control of the firm and that this   16 
effect  is  weaker  when  product  market  competition  is  strong.  Strong  product  market 
competition is, in itself, expected to have a positive effect on the share of women, thus a2 >0.
24  
 
The endogeneity problem 
In this difference-in-difference setting, all firms that are not changing ownership in the same 
time period act as the control group. Since firms do not randomly change ownership, this 
approach suffers from potential endogeneity problems. First of all, theory suggests that firms 
with inefficient management are more likely takeover targets than non-discriminatory ones. 
Further,  firms  that  change  ownership  may  already  before  the  takeover  be  developing 
differently from firms that are not taken over.
25 Our first take on the endogeneity problem is to 
deal with the issue of potentially omitted variables that may be related to the likelihood of 
being a takeover target. First, this is done by exploiting the fact that all takeovers do not occur 
in the same time period. Using the “staggered” nature of the data, we compare the baseline 
estimates from the full sample of firms to the estimates we get when dropping all firms that are 
never takeover targets from the sample. Since identification in both cases comes from within-
firm variation, the difference between the two approaches lies in the choice of control group.
26 
If takeover targets as a group have different observable a nd unobservable characteristics than 
other firms, using the target sample gives a better estimate of the actual takeover effect, 
provided that the characteristics are not time varying. Next,  we make use of very flexible 
                                                 
24 Our measure of competition is an estimated regressor which should be considered when estimating the standard 
errors. However, Murphy and Topel (1985) derive a correction for two-stage models of this kind and Hardin 
(2002) shows that the Huber-White sandwich estimator is asymptotically identical to the Murphy-Topel estimator. 
To allow for within firm or industry correlation over time, standard errors in our paper are adjusted for clustering 
at the firm or industry level. This adjustment is a cluster-robust version of the Huber-White sandwich estimator. 
25 In other words, the concern is that the “parallel trends” assumption is violated or, more technically, that 
acquisitions are correlated with the error term. 
26 See Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) for a det ailed discussion of such a “staggered” difference-in-difference 
approach.   17 
empirical specifications allowing takeover targets to be on a different trend than other firms 
and allowing the effects of observable firm characteristics to interact with the time period fixed 
effects. Finally, we undertake a before-and-after analysis checking if the timing of events is 
consistent with takeovers being the driving force.
27  
Wages 
We study how product market competition and takeovers affect the gender wage difference by 
estimating the following individual-level regression: 
 
ln(wage)ijt = b1acquisitionjt×womi + b2competitionjt×womi + b3 acquisitionjt   
+ b4 competitionjt + Xjt’b + Zit’b + µij + µt + εijt.    (2) 
 
In  this  regression,  ln(wage)ijt  is  the  log  of  the  full-time  equivalent  monthly  wage  of  an 
individual i, employed by firm j at time period t, and wom is a dummy variable taking the value 
of one for women. The interaction terms should be self-explanatory. X is a vector of time-
varying firm-level controls and Z is a vector of time-varying individual controls. We include a 
“spell” fixed-effect µij for each unique firm-individual combination (see e.g. Andrews et al. 
2005).
28 This variable will pick up the effect of all time invariant individual characteristics, 
including the main effect of being female. Finally, µt are time fixed effects and ijt is the error 
term. As the effect of control variables may differ between men and women we interact all 
control variables and the time fixed effect with wom.  
                                                 
27 This set of robustness checks is similar to that undertaken by Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999). 
28 Note that in the case of no mobility between firms, individual fixed -effects and individual-firm spell fixed-
effects are identical. Since the structure of our data is such that information on employees originates from repeated 
samples of firms, there is limited mobility between firms over time. This means that individual fixed effects  and 
spell-fixed effects are very similar.    18 
We expect  both  b1 and  b2 to  be positive.  In  case of pre-takeover discrimination, a 
takeover  should  reduce  the  gender  wage  differences.  Similarly,  intense  product  market 
competition  should  reduce  the  scope  for  discrimination  and  wage  differences  should  be 
relatively small when competition is high.  
One  possible  channel  between  competition  and  gender  wage  differences  is  through 
rent-sharing.  This  mechanism  will  be  directly  addressed  by  interacting  measures  of 
profitability with our measures of competitive pressures.  
 
Results 
Our main hypotheses concerning the impact of competitive pressures on female labor market 
outcomes rely on the assumption that entering owners of a firm will run the firm in a more 
efficient way than previous owners. There is a substantive literature on the productivity effects 
of takeovers (see e.g. Conyon et al. (2002), and Balsvik and Haller (2010) and the references 
therein) and we cannot fully address this question here. Before moving to the main results, 
however, we start by presenting some indicative evidence of such a mechanism in our sample 
of firms.  
In  Table  3,  we  run  value  added  per  worker  –  a  commonly  used  proxy  for  labor 
productivity  –  on  our  takeover  indicator,  using  a  firm  fixed  effects  model.  The  estimated 
coefficient  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  thus  indicating  that  labor  productivity 
increases after a takeover. In column two, we see that this productivity enhancing effect of a 
takeover is particularly large when product market competition is weak. Both these results are 
consistent  with  the  hypothesized  mechanism.  In  columns  three  and  four,  we  add  two 
potentially endogenous  control variables that can affect labor productivity; share of highly   19 
educated  workers  and  capital  per  labor  ratio.  Once  more,  the  results  indicate  that  labor 
productivity is increasing following a takeover and that the association is particularly strong in 
less competitive industries. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
 
Evidence of taste-based discrimination in employment decisions 
The question we now address is whether employment decisions are related to takeovers and the 
degree of product market competition. If this is the case, we expect takeovers to increase the 
share of women employed, in particular when product market competition is weak. An increase 
in product market competition should also in itself induce the firm to hire more women. Table 




In the first column, we estimate the effect of a takeover using a within firm differences-
in-differences specification. As can be seen, there is weak evidence of stronger product market 
competition being associated with a higher share of female employees. The takeover effect is 
small  and  not  statistically  significant,  however.  In  the  second  column,  we  consider  the 
interaction effect between takeovers and competition. In line with our expectations, we see that 
a takeover has a larger effect if product market competition is weak. Both the estimates of the 
direct effect and the interaction effect have the predicted signs and are statistically significant   20 
at the 1 percent level. Including a set of (potentially endogenous) firm level control variables 
(results presented in column three) does not affect the results. In column four, we only include 
domestic ownership changes and in column five, we only include cross-border acquisitions. 
There is some difference in the estimated coefficient size but qualitatively, the results point in 
the same direction. 
In column six we include the share of women at the two-digit industry level. According 
to our hypotheses this is an endogenous variable since the level of product market competition 
should affect the share of women employed in the industry. As expected the effect of product 
market competition is therefore somewhat weaken. The estimated effect of a takeover remains 
unchanged however. 
The estimated magnitudes of the interaction term and the direct acquisition effect are a 
cause  for  some  concern.  At  higher  than  median  levels  of  product  market  competition,  it 
appears as if a takeover reduces the share of female employees – a finding that is hard to 
reconcile with any theory of discrimination. To more closely investigate these effects, we study 
the effect of a takeover in sectors with low, medium and high product market competition. The 
results presented in column seven show that a takeover has a positive effect on the share of 
women when the product market competition is weak. Quantitatively speaking, the effect of a 
takeover is small: When the product market competition is weak a takeover increases the share 
of women employed with 0.4 percentage point. For a firm with an average share of women it 
implies an increase with 1.3 percent. In sectors with a medium level of competition there is no 
effect of a takeover and in highly competitive sectors there is a weak negative effect of a 
takeover on the share of women employed. While the negative effect in highly competitive   21 
industries is at odds with the theoretical predictions, it should be noted that the coefficient is 
small and only marginally statistically significant.  
 
Robustness checks 
Although the basic results show that a takeover affects the employment decision in the firm, 
several concerns remain. The most obvious objection to the results presented in Table 4 might 
be that takeover targets differ from those of other firms in many respects. In this section, we 
will address these concerns in different ways.  
 
Are takeover targets different? 
The difference-in-difference estimates will be corrupt if the share of women employed in the 
firms that change ownership follow a different trend than other firms. Our first take on this 
problem is to allow different time trends for the two groups of firms. In the first two columns 
of Table 5, we see that our results are not affected by allowing separate trends. Another way to 
make sure results are not due to differences between firms which change and firms which do 
not change ownership is to restrict the analysis to firms which change ownership. In columns 
three and four in Table 5, we only include firms that changed ownership at some point in time, 
thereby changing the control group to firms that will, but have not yet changed ownership. The 
effects are thus estimated only using the staggered nature of takeovers. 
A further concern is that firms changing ownership are differently affected by shocks 
contemporaneous to the takeover. Such shocks may cause the firms to adjust the input factors 
which, in turn, may cause firms to adjust the optimal share of female employees. One way to 
account for this is to allow the coefficient of the other explanatory variables to change over   22 
time by interacting all observable firm characteristics with the time period fixed effects. The 
results are presented in columns five and six. In these specifications, we also include a separate 
time trend for firms that change ownership over the period.  
The results largely remain the same between all different specifications and very close 
to the original estimates. All in all, the results suggest that the effects we are estimating are due 
to the takeover and not to some unobserved trends affecting firms in the takeover sample or 






Another potential concern is that a short-term change in economic conditions induces both an 
ownership change and an increase in the share of female employees. In this case, we expect to 
see some effect of the takeover prior to the actual change in ownership. In Table 6, we analyze 
the dynamics of the effect of a takeover by investigating how the takeover effect is spread over 
time.  
In the first column, we investigate the effect of the takeover after one, two and three 
years or more. To this end, we include a dummy for the year of the takeover, Acquisition t=0, 
and three dummies capturing the periods after the change of ownership. Acquisition t+1 is a 
dummy for the period after the takeover, Acquisition t+2 for two periods after the takeover and 
Acquisition>t+2 refers to a dummy that takes the value of one, three periods or more after the 
takeover. The results show an instant effect of the takeover that then remains constant over 
                                                 
29 Since the effects are consistent between specifications using different functional forms, we will from now on 
focus our attention on the more easily interpreted specifications using linear interaction terms.    23 
time. In the second column, we study whether the share of women started to increase prior to 
the actual takeover. This  is  done by including a dummy  for the  year before the takeover, 
Acquisition t-1, and a dummy for the year two years prior to the takeover, Acquisition t-2. 
Inspecting  the  estimates  reported  in  the  second  column,  we  see  no  effect  of  either  of  the 
dummies, thus suggesting that there was no effect prior to the takeover. In the third column, we 
allow for effects both before and after the takeover. Consistent with previous results, there is 
no effect before the takeover and the impact of the takeover increases somewhat over time.
30 In 
the last three columns of Table  6, we perform the same exercise as ab ove but only using the 
sample of firms that changes ownership at some point in time. The results are essentially 





An alternative explanation to the results is that firms that change ownership also increase their 
number of employees. As the number of potential female employees is likely to be relatively 
large  among  younger  cohorts,  the  share  of  women  employed  by  the  firm  could  therefore 
increase mechanically after a takeover. To explore this hypothesis, we regress (the log of) firm 
size on the acquisition takeover dummy, the measure of product market competition and an 
interaction term.  In the first column of Table 7, we find a marginally significant effect of 
takeovers on firm size. In columns two and three, we analyze how the share of women among 
the relatively young (up to 39 years) and old (above 40 years) employees are affected by a 
                                                 
30 We have also run similar regressions including the lagged and lead values of the interaction between acquisition 
and product market competition. The interaction effect is negative for all time periods after the takeover and 
insignificant for all time periods before. Results are available upon request.   24 
takeover. As the share of women in both age groups increases after the takeover, we are quite 




Another potential mechanical explanation for our results is that firms that are taken over also 
tend to outsource various parts of the production process. To the extent that women are over- 
or underrepresented in the lines of production being outsourced this can, again mechanically, 
affect the share of female employees in a firm. Unfortunately, we do not have any data on 
outsourcing but, for a subset of firms, we have firm-level data on offshoring measured as the 
share of imported intermediate goods in total sales. In column 4, we run our main regression on 
the sample of firms for which we have offshoring data. In column 5, we add the offshoring 
measure and in column 6 also an interaction with Competition and find that the results remain 
unchanged.  
  Finally, in the last column of Table 7, we run the main regression but exclude firms that 
experience a particular (more than 80 percent) increase in the number of employees in the year 
following the ownership change. Once more, the results remain unchanged, indicating that we 
are not just capturing some mechanical effect that coincides with the takeover. 
 
Sub-group analysis 
The results concerning the impact of takeovers on the share of female employees appear to be 
robust to various specifications. It is, however, possible that there are important heterogeneities 
among different employee subgroups. To analyze this, we calculate the share of women among   25 
employees with low, medium, and high levels of education. For a more limited sample of 
firms, we also have employee classifications and can calculate the share of female managers 
and CEOs.  
  As can be seen in the first three columns of Table 8, the increase in the share of female 
employees appears to be concentrated among those with medium levels of education. In the 
last two columns, we find no significant effect of takeovers on the share of female managers or 
CEOs. As glass ceiling effects (Albrecht et al. 2003) should be more concentrated among the 
most well educated and among the highest ranking employees, this can be seen as evidence 





So far, we have found support for the notion that market forces improve the relative labor 
market outcomes for women. Now, we turn to studying individual wages. The question we ask 
is whether female relative wages are affected by a takeover or by the degree of product market 
competition. In this part of the analysis, we control for employee-firm spell fixed effects to 
isolate the effect of a change in ownership on an individual’s wages. We also control for time-
varying firm characteristics such as number of employees, capital intensity and the fraction of 
the  workforce  that  is  high  skilled.  We  also  include  the  square  of  (potential)  work  life 
experience.
31  Since impact of the different covariates may differ for men and women we 
                                                 
31 We do not have actual work experience. Instead we use a measure of potential experience:  age minus years of 
schooling minus seven. As we are using spell-fixed effects, the effect of experience (not squared) is captured by 
the time-fixed effects.   26 
interact all control variables and the time effects with the gender dummy. This will control for 
factors such as that women on average have lower actual work experience than men, which in 
turn affect wages (see e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1997).  
The results are reported in Table 9. Inspecting the first column, we see a positive effect 
of a takeover on female relative wages. The magnitude of the effect is small: A takeover is 
associated with a 0.8 percent increase in women’s relative wages. Since the wage gap between 
men  and  women  in  our  sample  is  12  percent  after  adjusting  for  educational  attainment, 
experience  and  firm  fixed  effects,  a  takeover  reduces  the  gender  wage  gap  by  about  7.5 
percent. We also see in column 1 that increased product market competition appears to reduce 
wages, but there is no significant difference in the relationship between competition and the 
gender wage gap.   
Next, we study whether the effect of takeovers differ depending on the level of product 
market competition. In contrast to the results found on the effect on the share of women, the 




One  channel  through  which  competition  may  reduce  the  gender  wag  gap  is  rent-
sharing. In column 3, we look at this directly by including profits per employee and interacting 
this with a female dummy and the takeover indicator. Our hypothesis is that an ownership 
change will increase the rent-sharing with female employees relative to the rent-sharing with 
male employees. In line with this hypothesis, we find the triple interaction-term between these 
variables  to  be  positive  and  marginally  statistically  significant.  In  column  4,  we  find  no   27 
indication  that  the  gender  bias  of  rent-sharing  is  systematically  related  to  product  market 
competition.  In  columns  5  and  6,  we  include  interactions  between  both  acquisitions  and 
product market competition and find rent-sharing to be systematically more in favor of women 
following a takeover. In column 5 the standard errors are clustered at the firm-level and in 
column 6 at the industry level. 
 
Conclusions 
Theories of taste-based discrimination predict that discriminatory practices due to employer 
preferences should not prevail in competitive markets and competitive forces should reduce 
gender differences in labor market outcomes. The findings in this paper indicate that takeovers 
and product market competition do indeed have a positive impact on the relative position of 
Swedish female employees. According to theory, discriminatory  employers will hire fewer 
women  reducing  the  demand  for  female  labor  depressing  women’s  wages.  A  non-
discriminatory owner will then choose to hire more women to the going market wage. Thus, 
when a non-discriminatory owner takes over a discriminating firm we expect the share of 
women employed to increase. In contrast, the effect on within firm gender wage differentials is 
not clear. A reason why relative wages could be affected by a discriminatory firm is that wages 
may reflect differences in female career opportunities. 
We use detailed Swedish employer-employee data on the private sector to analyze how 
product  market  competition  and  firm  takeovers  affect  workforce  gender  composition  and 
gender wage differentials. In line with these predictions we find that when product market   28 
competition  is  weak,
32  a takeover leads to a 1.3 percent increase in the share of female 
employees for a firm with an average rate of female employment. The effect i s concentrated 
among women with medium level of education whereas we find no effects on the share of 
managers and CEOs. For firms active on markets with medium or strong product market 
competition, takeovers have no effect on the gender composition of the  firm’s  workforce. 
Moreover, we find that a takeover reduces the within firm gender wage gap with 7.5 percent. A 
takeover  also  reduces  the  gender  differences  in  rent-sharing,  thus  suggesting  that 
discriminatory practices may work through this channel. While these effects are small they 
suggest that takeovers reduce discriminatory management practices. A reason why the effects 
found  here  are  small  in  magnitude  could  be  that  the  mere  threat  of  takeovers  provides 
incentives to manage firms efficiently. An interesting venue for future research would thus be 
to analyze how the competitiveness of the market for corporate control affects discriminatory 
behavior.  
We  find  that  increased  industry  level  product  market  competition  leads  to  a  small 
increase in the share of women employed in firms in these industries. This does however not 
translate into reductions in the industry level wage gap. One explanation for this result could be 
that the labor force is not sector specific and thus increased demand for women in one sector 
increase wages for all women. Product market competition in one industry would then have 
only negligible effects on the firm’s gender wage gap.   
Our results do not refute the possibility of other types of discrimination. Statistical 
discrimination, for example, may affect the position of women on the labor market. However, 
also statistical discrimination could be affected by takeovers and product market competition 
since competitive pressures may improve the quality of the hiring and promotion processes. 
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Table 1. Correlations between acquisition and industry level variables  
  Share 
women 
Competition  Capital/L  Size  Value added/L  Share high 
skilled 












Presented are correlation coefficients between industry means at the 2-digit SIC (SNI2) level. P-values within 
brackets.      35 












Share women  Number of women/employees  0.317 
(0.247) 
-- 
Acquisition  A dummy variable that takes the value of one in the 
year, and all periods after, the firm changes 






Competition  The elasticity of variable profits to average variable 















Share high skilled  Number of high skilled workers with at least 3 years 





Value added/L  (Sales-operational expenses excluding wages) / 









    (0.515)   
Offshoring  Share of imported intermediate goods in total sales. 




       
Number of firm-year 
observations 
  128,848  -- 
       
Individual variables       
ln(Wage) women  Monthly full-time equivalent salary, including wage, 
bonus, payment for overtime and work at unsocial 
hours.  
--  9.688 
(0.264) 
ln(Wage) men      9.840 
(0.324) 
Experience  Age minus number of years of schooling minus 
seven. 
--  22 
(13) 
Women  Dummy = 1 if female.  --  0.343 
(0.475) 
       
Number of individual-
year observations 
  --  9,989,596 
Presented are means with standard deviations within brackets. The data cover Swedish firms and individuals for 
the period 1990-2002. The panel of firms is unbalanced and the median number of observations per firm is 4. All 
monetary variables are in 1995 SEK. 
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Table 3. The effect of acquisitions on labor productivity. Firm-level estimates 1990-2002. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Acquisition  0.015***  0.055***  0.014***  0.044*** 
  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.005)  (0.013) 
Competition    -0.011    -0.126 
    (0.120)    (0.113) 
Acq.×competition    -0.863***    -0.629*** 
    (0.265)    (0.225) 
         
Capital/L      0.097***  0.096*** 
      (0.013)  (0.013) 
Share high skilled      -0.054  -0.056 
      (0.047)  (0.046) 
         
Firm FE  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  yes  yes  yes  yes 
         
Observations  128,848  128,848  128,848  128,848 
Number of firms  27,104  27,104  27,104  27,104 
R-squared  0.02  0.02  0.07  0.07 
The dependent variable is the value-added per employed. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition 
period and thereafter; zero before. Competition is the industry level of product market competition. Capital/L is 
the capital-labor ratio. Share high skilled is the share of employees with post-secondary education. All regressions 
include firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively 
 Table 4. The effect of takeovers and product market competition on the share of women employed. Firm-level estimates 1990-2002. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
        Domestic  Cross-
border 
   
               
Acquisition  0.001  0.010***  0.010***  0.007**  0.016***  0.009***   
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.002)   
Competition  0.044*  0.077***  0.075***  0.060**  0.037  0.048*  0.066** 
  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
Acq.× competition    -0.189***  -0.188***  -0.001**  -0.002**  -0.171***   
    (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.045)   
Acq.× low competition              0.004*** 
              (0.002) 
Acq.×medium competition              0.001 
              (0.001) 
Acq.×high competition              -0.002* 
              (0.001) 
Ln(size)      -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.002  -0.005***  -0.005*** 
      (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Capital/L      0.001  0.003***  0.002*  0.001  0.001 
      (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Share high skilled      -0.015  -0.013  -0.008  -0.016  -0.015 
      (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Share women             0.067***   
(industry)            (0.011)   
               
Firm FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
               
Observations  128,848  128,848  128,848  110,952  87,409  128,848  128,848 
No of Firms  27,104  27,104  27,104  24,477  19,911  27,104  27,104 
R-squared  0.007  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.009  0.011  0.009 
The dependent variable is the share of women employed. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter; zero before. Competition is 
the industry level of product market competition. Ln(size) is the log of the number of employees. Capital/L is the capital-labor ratio. Share high skilled is the 
share of employees with post-secondary education. Share women (industry) is the share of women employed at the two-digit industry level. Column (4) excludes 
all cross-border mergers and column (5) excludes all domestic mergers. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5. The effect of takeovers and product market competition on the share of women employed. Firm-level estimates 1990-2002. 
Different trends for acquired firms and time varying explanatory variables. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
      Only target firms     
             
Acquisition  0.010***    0.013***    0.008***   
  (0.002)    (0.003)    (0.002)   
Competition  0.076***  0.066**  0.129***  0.100**  0.055**  0.047* 
  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.028)  (0.027) 
Acq.×competition  -0.191*** 
(0.044) 
  -0.239*** 
(0.049) 
  -0.141*** 
(0.044) 
 
Acq.× low competition    0.005***    0.005***    0.003** 
    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Acq.×medium competition     0.001    0.001    0.001 
    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Acq.×high competition    -0.002*    -0.003**    -0.001 
    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001) 
             
Firm FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Target×trend  yes  yes  no  no  yes  yes 
Firm control  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Firm controls ×Year FE  no  no  no  no  yes  yes 
             
Observations  128,848  128,848  49,956  49,956  128,848  128,848 
Number of firms  27,104  27,104  8,609  8,609  27,104  27,104 
R-squared  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
The dependent variable is the share of women employed. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter; zero before. Competition is 
the industry level of product market competition. Firm controls are the same as in Table 4; the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the 
share of high skilled. Target×trend is an interaction between firms that are ever takeover targets and a trend variable. Firm controls×Year FE means that firm 
controls are interacted with year fixed effects. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects.  Columns (3) and (4) only include firms that 
change ownership. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
 
 
Table 6. The effect of takeovers and product market competition on the share of women 
employed. Firm-level estimates 1990-2002. Before and after analysis. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
        Only target firms 
             
Acquisition t-2    -0.002  -0.001    -0.001  -0.001 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001) 
Acquisition t-1    -0.001  -0.001    -0.001  -0.000 
    (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.002)  (0.002) 
Acquisition t=0  0.010***  0.009***  0.009***  0.013***  0.012***  0.013*** 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Acquisition t+1  0.009***    0.008***  0.012***    0.011*** 
  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003) 
Acquisition t+2  0.010***    0.009***  0.013***    0.012*** 
  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.003) 
Acquisition >t+2  0.010***    0.009***  0.014***    0.013*** 
  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.003)    (0.004) 
Competition  0.074***  0.075***  0.074***  0.127***  0.128***  0.126*** 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
Acq.×competition  -0.184***  -0.186***  -0.183***  -0.236***  -0.236***  -0.234*** 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
             
Firm FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Firm controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
             
Observations  128,848  128,848  128,848  49,956  49,956  49,956 
Number of firms  27,104  27,104  27,104  8,609  8,609  8,609 
R-squared  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
The dependent variable is the share of women employed. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition 
period and thereafter; zero before. Acquisition t-2 takes the value of one two years prior to the acquisition and 
zero otherwise. The other Acquisition t+/- variables are defined accordingly. Firm controls are the same as in 
Table 4; the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the share of high skilled. Columns (4)-(6) 
only include firms that change ownership. All regressions include firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects. . 
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Table 7. Alternative explanations. Workforce composition and offshoring. Firm-level 
estimates 1990-2002. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 






Share of women employed 






               
Acquisition  0.031*  0.014***  0.015***  0.006*  0.006*  0.006*  0.010*** 
  (0.018)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Competition  0.129  0.130***  0.104***  0.016  0.016  0.014  0.081*** 
  (0.192)  (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.027) 
Acq.×competition  -0.294  -0.297***  -0.258***  -0.112*  -0.112*  -0.107*  -0.185*** 
  (0.314)  (0.068)  (0.059)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.045) 
Offshoring          -0.003  -0.000   
          (0.007)  (0.009)   
Offshoring×comp.            -0.007   
            (0.010)   
               
Firm FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Firm controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
               
Observations  128,848  128,510  127,675  77,766  77,766  77,766  127,830 
Number of firms  27,104  27,007  26,703  21,449  21,449  21,449  26,937 
R-squared  0.08  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
The dependent variable in column (1) is the log of the number of employees and firm controls are the capital-labor 
ratio and the share of high skill. In columns (2) and (3) the dependent variables are the share of young and old 
women employed, respectively. In columns (4)-(7), the dependent variable is the share of women employed. Firm 
controls are the same as in Table 4; the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the share of 
high skilled. Columns (4)-(6) only include firms for which we have data on offshoring and in column (7) firms are 
excluded which increase more than 80 percent in size during the year of the ownership change. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 8. The effect on various employee sub-groups 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Low 
Education 
Medium Education  High Education  Managers  CEOs 
           
Acquisition  -0.006  0.022***  0.001  0.004  -0.002 
  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.027) 
Competition  0.039  0.058  -0.043  -0.058  -0.038 
  (0.096)  (0.091)  (0.168)  (0.212)  (0.423) 
Acq.×competition  0.029  -0.347***  -0.209  -0.131  0.101 
  (0.151)  (0.125)  (0.221)  (0.250)  (0.449) 
           
Firm FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Firm controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
           
Observations  35,355  40,283  25,053  15,872  8,050 
Number of firms  11,004  12,433  7,677  5,355  3,450 
R-squared  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.00 
The dependent variable  is the share of  women among employees  with low  education (column (1)),  medium 
education (column (2)) and high education  (column (3)). In column (4) the dependent variable is the share of 
female managers and column (5) female CEOs. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and 
thereafter; zero before. Competition is the industry level of product market competition. Firm controls are the 
same as in Table 4; the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the share of high skilled. All 
regressions include firm-level fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 
firm level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
    
Table 9. The effect of takeovers and product market competition on women’s relative wages. 
Individual-level estimates 1990-2002. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Acquisition  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006    -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.004)    (0.004)  (0.003) 
Wom.× Acq.  0.008**  0.008  0.006**    0.006**  0.006* 
  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.004) 
Competition  -0.292***  -0.295***    -0.284***  -0.275***  -0.275 
  (0.102)  (0.106)    (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.172) 
Wom.×Comp.  0.110  0.113    0.122  0.107  0.107 
  (0.076)  (0.084)    (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.118) 
Wom.×Comp.×Acq.    -0.012         
    (0.092)         
Comp.× Acq.    0.011         
    (0.147)         
Wom.×Profits/L      -0.000  0.003  -0.006  -0.006 
      (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Profits/L      0.001  0.010  0.015**  0.015* 
      (0.003)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Acq.×Profits/L      -0.003    -0.005  -0.005 
      (0.007)    (0.007)  (0.008) 
Wom.×Acq.×Profits/L      0.007*    0.007**  0.007* 
      (0.003)    (0.003)  (0.004) 
Comp.× Profits/L        -0.179  -0.223**  -0.223* 
        (0.142)  (0.107)  (0.128) 






               
Spell FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year FE*wom  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Control variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Control variables*wom  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
             
Observations  9,989,595  9,989,595  9,989,595  9,989,595  9,989,595  9,989,595 
Number of spells  3,327,793  3,327,793  3,327,793  3,327,793  3,327,793  3,327,793 
R-squared  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45 
The dependent variable is log wages. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter; zero 
before.  Competition  is  the  industry  level  of  product  market  competition.  Profits/L  is  the  profits  per  employee. 
Individual control is the square of work experience. Individual level control is potential experience squared. Firm 
controls are the log of the number of employees, the capital-labor ratio and the share of employees with post-
secondary education. All regressions include spell (individual×firm) and year fixed effects. In all columns, standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, except column (6) where they are clustered at the 2-digit industry 
level. ***, **, * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 